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ABSTRACT 
Discount negotiations are a prevalent phenomenon in retailing and serve as key instruments 
for adjusting retail prices to the individual customer. Accurately perceiving the importance 
the customer attaches to price, which the authors label customer price importance (CPI) 
sensing, should be critical to retail salespeople’s negotiation performance. However, extant 
research has neither conceptually nor empirically investigated the role of CPI sensing in 
customer-salesperson interactions. Addressing this research void, this study analyzes both 
antecedents and consequences of salespeople’s accurate CPI sensing in discount negotiations 
with customers. The authors use a four-sources multi-level data set from the B2C automobile 
retailing context that comprises data on 537 salesperson–customer interactions. Results 
provide evidence that through accurate CPI sensing, salespeople are able to reduce the 
discounts they grant to customers substantially (on average by $616 per transaction). 
Moreover, with respect to CPI sensing accuracy, results show that retail salespeople 
misperceive CPI owing to reliance on heuristic customer cues.  
Keywords: retail negotiations; individual pricing; perceptual accuracy; price importance; 
negotiation performance 
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Introduction 
The pricing policy constitutes one of the most powerful tools of retailers to increase profits 
(Levy et al. 2004; Gauri, Trivedi, and Grewal 2008). An important goal of retailers’ pricing 
policy is to charge prices which maximize their margins while maintaining their customers’ 
purchase intention (Kopalle et al. 2009; Simon and Dolan 1996). Therefore, retailers try to 
customize prices that match their individual customers’ willingness to pay (Grewal et al. 2011; 
Johnson, Tellis, and Ip 2013). One approach for retailers to individualize selling prices is to 
allow customers to negotiate for discounts (Clopton 1984; Nagle and Holden 1995). Discount 
negotiations are a prevalent phenomenon in major U.S. retail industries such as jewelry ($33 
billion in revenues in 2013), furniture ($53 billion), or automobile wholesaling ($489 billion) 
(Marks 2013; IBISWorld Industry Information 2014). Every second customer in the US 
negotiates for a better deal on his or her purchases in the retailing context (Marks 2013). 
To successfully negotiate discounts which satisfy their customers yet are 
simultaneously profitable from their company’s perspective, salespeople should understand 
their customers’ preferences (Murnighan et al. 1999). A particularly relevant customer 
preference which salespeople should address in their sales strategy in order to negotiate 
optimal discounts should be the customers’ specific price importance (CPI) (Wakefield and 
Inman 2003). In our study, we refer to CPI as the relevance of price for the customer’s 
purchase decision compared to other (benefit-related) product attributes. By investigating the 
importance of price relative to other product attributes we reflect findings of behavioral pricing 
research that customers evaluate the price of a product in relation to its value or benefits 
(Hamilton and Srivastava 2008; Zeithaml 1984). The relative nature of CPI is the major 
difference to related concepts like price-sensitivity or reservation price. Understanding the 
relative importance of price helps retail salespeople in negotiations to adjust their sales strategy 
to the individual customer by focusing either on monetary or non-monetary benefits. 
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Despite the strong relevance of discount negotiations for retailers’ profitability, many 
sales managers are dissatisfied with their sales force’s current performance in the realm of 
price enforcement. Nearly 40% of sales executives state that salespeople’s capability to avoid 
discounting needs improvement (CSO Insights 2011). Interestingly, 35 years ago Stephenson, 
Cron, and Frazier (1979) suggested that in negotiations, salespeople are either not motivated to 
or capable of setting prices corresponding to the maximum the customer is willing to pay. 
While several studies have analyzed the effect of incentive systems on salespeople’s 
motivation to make profitable pricing decisions (Dalrymple, Stephenson, and Cron 1981; 
Frenzen et al. 2010), the question of whether salespeople are capable of negotiating prices 
which correspond to their customers’ willingness to pay in discount negotiations has not been 
addressed to date (please refer to Figure 1). A key success factor of individualized pricing 
should be the salesperson’s ability to acquire accurate CPI information. We refer to the process 
of acquiring this CPI information during the interaction as CPI sensing.  
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
In order to further explore the practical relevance of CPI sensing, we employed the 
market research agency usamp to conduct a cross-industry survey of 100 US sales managers 
from several retail industries on the issue of acquiring CPI information. The survey revealed 
that 68% of the sales managers consider CPI sensing to be a very important salesperson ability 
(31% consider it to be important, and only 1% to be not important). 
Despite its considerable practical relevance for retailing, extant academic works did not 
investigate the role of CPI sensing in customer-salesperson negotiations. Neither retailing 
research nor negotiation research contribute to an understanding of the process of acquiring 
and using CPI information in customer–salesperson interactions, making CPI sensing a novel 
and important concept. Thus, examining CPI sensing may significantly extend research on 
price discrimination in retailing (Grewal et al. 2011; Xia, Kukar-Kinney, and Monroe 2010) by 
examining salespeople’s capability of negotiating profitable discounts. Regarding research on 
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the delegation of pricing authority to the salesforce (e.g., Frenzen et al. 2010; Stephenson, 
Cron, and Frazier 1979) the introduction of CPI sensing challenges the critical assumption 
inherent in this research stream—that salespeople automatically possess CPI information that is 
superior to that of their management. For the field of negotiation research our study provides 
further evidence for the effectiveness of gathering customer information in price negotiations 
(De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004; Puccinelli et al. 2009) and indicates that CPI sensing is a key 
success factor that should be considered in future negotiation research.  
In our study, we provide a comprehensive account of CPI sensing. We seek to answer 
three key research questions: (1) Does CPI sensing accuracy improve negotiation performance 
in a retail context? (2) What are the contingency factors of CPI sensing accuracy effectiveness? 
(3) Which factors affect the accuracy of a salesperson’s CPI sensing? To answer these research 
questions, we conducted an empirical investigation in the B2C automobile retailing context. 
We examined a sample of 537 real-life salesperson–customer interactions and data gathered 
from four independent sources. 
Our results show that CPI sensing accuracy essentially improves salespeople’s 
negotiation performance and that this effect is increased by high revenue goal importance for 
the salesperson Specifically, accurate CPI sensing helps salespeople to grant on average 1.96% 
lesser discount (6.57% compared to 8.53%) while maintaining the customers’ purchase 
intention. Another key finding of our study is that salespeople’s CPI assessments are distorted 
by reliance on cognitive heuristics. In building CPI perceptions, salespeople make use of 
heuristic customer-specific cues (customer age, customer product knowledge, and customer-
salesperson relationship length) which distort their perceptions. For example, by relying on 
customer age, salespeople underestimate CPI on average by 14%.Beyond its theoretical 
contributions, our study holds several implications for retailing practice. By identifying 
accurate CPI information as a highly effective characteristic for segmenting customers and 
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setting individual prices, we provide retailing practitioners with a powerful means for adjusting 
their pricing policy to the market, as CPI sensing accuracy has a strong impact on profit.  
Conceptual Framework 
The central construct of our conceptual framework is CPI sensing accuracy—defined as the 
degree to which the salesperson correctly perceives CPI ( please refer to Figure 2 for an 
overview of the conceptual framework). CPI sensing refers to the salesperson’s perception 
formation of how much importance a customer attaches to price relative to other product 
attributes, thereby constituting a social perception. Therefore, in what follows, we develop our 
conceptual framework from prior literature on social cognition theory (e.g., Chaiken and Trope 
1999; Kelley 2013; Swann 1984). We hypothesize not only the effects of CPI sensing accuracy 
on negotiation outcomes but also CPI sensing accuracy antecedents. Below, we elaborate on 
the parts of our conceptual framework in further detail. 
Does CPI sensing accuracy improve negotiation performance in a retail context? 
Outcomes of CPI sensing accuracy. In social interactions, individuals form perceptions about 
their counterparts in order to attain their interaction goals (Kelley 2013; Swann 1984). These 
perceptions help people predict their counterparts’ behavior and adapt their own behavior 
appropriately (Swann 1984). In retail price negotiations, we argue that salespeople need to 
form accurate perceptions of CPI in order to deploy accurate sales strategies to achieve a key 
negotiation goal: to negotiate the least possible discount which is still acceptable for the 
customer (Huber and Neale 1987). This goal implies that two negotiation outcomes of CPI 
sensing accuracy have to be considered: First, the negotiated discount, and second, the 
likelihood of an agreement, i.e., the customer’s purchase intention. Reflecting these two goals, 
we include negotiated discount and customers’ purchase intention in the model. To capture that 
the negotiated discount may influence customers’ purchase intention, we specify the respective 
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effect in the model. Furthermore, including purchase intention allows us to capture the 
likelihood of a later agreement, if the customer delays the final purchase decision.  
What are the contingency factors of CPI sensing accuracy effectiveness? Moderators of 
the CPI sensing accuracy–performance link. As prior negotiation research provides clear 
evidence for the highly contingent nature of negotiation behavior (e.g., Stuhlmacher and 
Champagne 2000), we include moderators into our conceptual model. Specifically, we 
incorporate moderators to clarify the conditions under which CPI sensing accuracy affects 
negotiation outcomes. For the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiated discount, we 
suggest that the salesperson’s revenue goal importance should represent a key moderator. Prior 
research has established that task-related goals increase salespeople’s motivation to spend more 
effort on their work (Fu, Richards and Jones 2009). Thus, revenue goal importance should raise 
the salesperson’s motivation to actually use the acquired knowledge. With respect to the effect 
of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase intention, we suggest that, rather than a direct effect, an 
interaction effect occurs of CPI sensing accuracy and the salesperson’s customer orientation. 
Customer orientation is considered one of the most important factors that drives retail 
salespeople’s success (Goff et al. 1997; Saxe and Weitz 1982) and should indicate whether the 
salesperson utilizes CPI information in a customer-friendly manner or not. If the salesperson 
only focuses on negotiating the least possible discount without having the customer’s interests 
and needs in mind, a detrimental effect of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase intention is likely. 
 Which factors affect a salesperson’s CPI sensing accuracy? Antecedents of CPI sensing 
accuracy. When forming perceptions in social interactions perceivers use various cues to infer 
a target’s traits (e.g., Borkenau and Liebler 1992; Brunswik 1955). These cues may be either 
valid if they correlate with the actual traits they should predict, or invalid if there is no 
correlation (Zebrowitz and Collins 1997). In this respect, the dual-process model of impression 
formation (Brewer 1988; Chaiken and Trope 1999) posits that individuals form perceptions 
either heuristically or analytically. Particularly in sales or negotiation encounters, when it 
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comes to first impressions (Hall, Ahearne, and Sujan 2015) and time restrictions are likely (De 
Dreu 2003) salespeople frequently rely on heuristic processing and only consider a very limited 
set of cues (Szymanski and Churchill 1990). This increases the likelihood of stereotyping and 
misperceptions (De Dreu 2003) and promotes the utilization of rather invalid cues. Our study 
aims at identifying invalid heuristic cues which lead salespeople to misperceive CPI. 
Therefore, we included three potential cues into our framework on which salespeople may rely 
when heuristically processing customer information: the customer’s age, the customer’s 
product knowledge and the salesperson-customer relationship length. Age is suggested to be 
one of the first and most important cues individuals take into account when forming social 
perceptions (Cuddy and Fiske 2002). Customer product knowledge should be easily observable 
to a salesperson and may provide an important heuristic indicator regarding the distribution of 
power in the negotiation (De Dreu and van Kleef 2004). Eventually, relationship length should 
be an available cue the salesperson may utilize to infer the customer’s attitude towards the 
interaction (Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014).1  
---- Insert Figure 2 about here ---- 
Hypotheses Development 
As our primary research question addresses whether CPI sensing accuracy improves 
negotiation performance, we first present our argumentation on CPI sensing accuracy 
outcomes. We then derive hypotheses regarding CPI sensing accuracy antecedents. 
Consequences of CPI Sensing Accuracy for Negotiation Outcomes 
In what follows, we derive the hypothesis for the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiated 
discount. On the basis of social cognition research (Swann 1984) and findings from personal 
                                                          
1 We acknowledge that there may be further potential heuristic CPI sensing cues. However, in order to keep the 
study concise, we refrained from including additional cues. Particularly gender and race have been discussed in 
prior literature as important sources of stereotypes. Unfortunately, both cues did not fit the sample’s context. In 
automobile retailing gender stereotypes constitute a prevalent, yet also very idiosyncratic issue (Ayres and 
Siegelman 1995) and race stereotypes are much less relevant in the European market as compared to the US. 
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selling and negotiation research (e.g., Spiro and Weitz 1990; Hüffmeier et al. 2014), we 
suggest that CPI sensing accuracy enables the salesperson to tailor the sales strategy to the 
individual customer’s needs and thereby decreases the necessity of granting discounts. 
Accurate CPI sensing should provide the salesperson with valuable information regarding the 
relevance of price for the customer’s purchase decision compared to other product attributes. 
High CPI should indicate that the customer is highly focused on the product’s price and is 
primarily interested in minimizing the costs of the product. Low CPI, in turn, should indicate 
that other product attributes are more important and that the customer is more interested in 
non-monetary benefits of the product (such as quality or usability). This notion aligns with 
findings from Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel (2014) who differentiate customers with a price focus 
from customers with a quality focus and demonstrate that these customers substantially differ 
in their negotiation behavior. 
In line with adaptive selling research (Spiro and Weitz 1990), this information should 
help the salesperson to adapt his or her sales strategy to the individual customer’s preferences. 
If price is more important for the customer the sales strategy should focus on price-related 
aspects—every benefit of the product should be illustrated in terms of the costs the customer 
might save (e.g., a low mileage) or the monetary value a certain feature has (e.g., the price of a 
radio). If other attributes are more important than price the communication should focus on the 
(non-monetary) benefits of the product. 
Thus, ideally, a salesperson facing a customer with high CPI will address the 
customer’s price focus in the selling presentation. Being aware that the customer attaches high 
importance to price, the salesperson would stress the monetary value of the product attributes 
(like e.g., the regular price of a radio in the car). Conversely, if the customer has low CPI the 
salesperson would employ a different strategy and put more effort into presenting the product 
in terms of non-monetary benefits, like for example the security to have a reliable product or 
social value stemming from image effects. To this effect, the salesperson’s exhibition of an 
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appropriate sales strategy strongly depends on the salesperson’s CPI sensing accuracy since 
inaccurate perceptions would induce the salesperson to employ a less effective and maybe even 
detrimental sales strategy which does not take the customer’s preferences into account. With an 
appropriate sales strategy the salesperson should have to grant the customer significantly lesser 
discount than with an inappropriate sales strategy (see Figure 3).  
 ---- Insert Figure 3 about here ----  
In conclusion, this means that in both cases—for customers with high or low CPI—CPI 
sensing accuracy is highly relevant for the salesperson’s choice of sales strategy. Although a 
high price-focus in the salesperson’s argumentation strategy is required for customers with 
high CPI, it may have detrimental effects for customers who are initially not focused on price. 
In conclusion, accurate CPI sensing helps salespeople to choose an argumentation strategy that 
addresses the customer’s individual preferences in the best possible manner, and as a result CPI 
sensing accuracy is positively related to economic negotiation success. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H1:  The higher a salesperson’s CPI sensing accuracy, the lesser the negotiated 
discount in a price negotiation with a customer. 
Moderators for the CPI Sensing Accuracy–Negotiation Outcome Link 
In the following, we develop the hypothesis for the interaction effect between CPI sensing 
accuracy and revenue goal importance and subsequently elaborate on the CPI sensing 
accuracy–customer orientation interaction. We suggest that revenue goal importance amplifies 
the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on the negotiated discount because it provides the 
salesperson with a stronger motivation to use the information acquired through CPI sensing. 
Revenue goal importance. We define this construct as the perceived urge of salespeople 
to meet their revenue goals. Salespeople commonly have to meet such goals to obtain 
contingent bonuses (John and Weitz 1989). Agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) proposes that 
revenue goals should have positive effects on sales performance and the positive effects of 
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goals on performance have also been confirmed in negotiation research (e.g., Huber and Neale 
1987; Zetik and Stuhlmacher 2002). These effects can be explained by an increase in 
motivation to close the gap between goals and actual performance (Campion and Lord 1982; 
Hollenbeck and Williams 1987). To close this gap, salespeople should use resources that are 
instrumental to their performance more efficiently. The CPI information acquired with help of 
CPI sensing represents such a resource. 
Thus, salespeople with high revenue goal importance should be strongly motivated to 
leverage the potential of CPI information to increase negotiation performance. This leveraging 
implies that goal-oriented salespeople may more carefully adapt their argumentation strategy to 
the individual customer and thereby negotiate lesser discounts. Hence: 
H2:  The higher the salesperson’s revenue goal importance, the stronger the negative 
effect of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiated discount. 
Customer orientation. We suggest that customer orientation combined with a high level 
of CPI sensing proficiency should help to alleviate a common problem negotiators face—the 
so-called negotiator’s dilemma (Lax and Sebenius 1986; Hüffmeier et al. 2014). This dilemma 
refers to the effect that claiming value for oneself during a negotiation typically increases 
individual outcomes but simultaneously decreases the likelihood of an agreement and may 
damage the relationship. However, we do not assume CPI sensing accuracy to have this 
negative effect on purchase intention. 
Since with help of CPI sensing the salesperson acquires valuable information on the 
customer’s preferences he or she should be able to estimate more precisely whether a certain 
level of discount is necessary to close the deal with the customer and thus avoid a negative 
impact of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase intention. A positive effect on purchase intention, 
however, should be very unlikely as well, as accurate CPI sensing is used by the salesperson to 
grant a lesser discount to the customer and hence reduces his or her economic value from the 
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transaction. As both, a positive as well as a negative effect, should be unlikely, we do not 
hypothesize a direct effect of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase intention. 
However, CPI sensing accuracy should be related to customers’ purchase decision if it 
is combined with customer orientation. Customer orientation refers to the degree to which 
salespeople try to help their customers to satisfy their needs (Saxe and Weitz 1982) and 
therefore reflects whether the salesperson uses CPI information with the customer’s best 
interest in mind or only with his or her own interests in mind. A customer-oriented salesperson 
should show the customer that he or she is understood and address the customer’s needs in the 
selling presentation.  
Accurate CPI information combined with customer orientation enables the salesperson 
to make small concessions at the right moment to display good will and should prevent an 
adverse effect of CPI sensing accuracy on the customer’s purchase intention (Fisher and Ury 
1981). Whereas a salesperson low on customer orientation might merely use CPI information 
to avoid concessions which do not increase the customer’s perceived value of the product, a 
customer-oriented salesperson might additionally make small concessions regarding issues the 
customer values (Thompson and Hastie 1990). Thus, the more accurate the CPI perception and 
the more customer-oriented the salesperson the more satisfied the customer should be with the 
interaction. In contrast, a salesperson with low customer orientation may not be highly 
sensitive to the customer’s interests. The salesperson should mainly focus on negotiating the 
least possible discount, taking a positional bargaining approach (Fisher and Ury 1981), and 
therefore use CPI information to get as close as possible to the customer’s limit. However, this 
adversarial negotiation approach may lead the customer to feel misunderstood or exploited, 
which should afflict purchase intention. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3:  Customer orientation moderates the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase 
intention. Specifically, if the salesperson has a low customer orientation, CPI 
sensing accuracy negatively influences purchase intention. 
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Antecedents of CPI Sensing Accuracy 
Having hypothesized the effects of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiation outcomes, we now 
address antecedents for CPI sensing accuracy. We derive hypotheses regarding three potential 
heuristic cues and their potential effects on CPI sensing accuracy. These are customer age, 
customer product knowledge and the salesperson-customer relationship length. 
Customer age. Age is a demographic criterion frequently used for customer segmentation 
(Holbrook and Schindler 1996) and is also mentioned as a key indicator for customer 
categorization in sales interactions (e.g., Szymanski 1988). Cuddy and Fiske (2002) even state 
that “in first encounters, age is one of the earliest characteristics we notice about other people” 
(Cuddy and Fiske 2002, p.3). 
 Being such an important cue in social interactions, it seems likely that salespeople rely 
on customer age when forming CPI perceptions based on heuristic processing. This view is 
supported by research on age-related stereotypes, suggesting that older people are usually 
perceived as being less competitive (e.g., Haefner 1977) and less dominant (Montepare and 
Zebrowitz-McArthur 1988). Salespeople who harbor these stereotypes in discount negotiations 
may heuristically infer older customers to be low on CPI, since a high importance of price is 
usually accompanied by a more competitive and dominant negotiation behavior (Brett, Pinkley, 
and Jackofsky 1996). 
Importantly, however, the inferences developed above are based on age-related 
stereotypes. Since stereotypes are often overgeneralized and exaggerated and may reflect a 
biased reality (Wieseke et al. 2012) these inferences do not have to reflect actual age 
differences in CPI. More precisely, salespeople who harbor these stereotypes and rely on 
heuristic processing may overgeneralize their perception that older people are less competitive 
and therefore systematically underestimate CPI of older people. Considering that salespeople’s 
CPI assessments may be biased by overgeneralizations through age-related stereotypes, we 
hypothesize: 
12 
 
H4:  The higher the customer’s age, the greater the salesperson’s underestimation of 
CPI. 
Customer product knowledge. Customers with sophisticated product knowledge are 
usually more involved with the product than customers with a lower knowledge level (Park and 
Moon 2003). Highly involved customers should be better informed about product 
characteristics, alternatives in the market, and particularly about prices (Park and Moon 2003). 
Furthermore, prior research has frequently mentioned expertise as a source of power in 
negotiations (e.g., De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004; French and Raven 1959). Therefore, when 
relying on heuristic processing salespeople might perceive knowledgeable customers to be 
more threatening regarding the economic negotiation outcome (negotiated discount) and 
believe that they put a higher emphasis on the selling price.  
However, we suggest this interpretation to be distorted by a negativity bias (Rozin and 
Royzman 2001). This perceptual bias describes the tendency of individuals to put more weight 
on negative than on positive information. In line with research on this bias we suggest 
salespeople to put more weight on the negative interpretation outlined above (i.e., the customer 
is knowledgeable of price levels which increases his or her CPI and thus, it is more difficult to 
achieve a good negotiation outcome) than on a different potential positive interpretation which 
we explain below. That is, the perceptual heuristic that highly knowledgeable customers are 
more sensitive to price omits that customers with a high product knowledge also value product 
quality differently than less involved customers. Because of their high involvement, they 
develop a more sophisticated understanding of the product’s attributes and value and thus 
might accept higher prices (Lichtenstein, Bloch, and Black 1988). This view is supported by 
Rao and Sieben (1992) who find that in fact knowledgeable customers have a higher 
willingness to pay than customers with low product knowledge.  
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In conclusion, we suggest that salespeople fall prey to a negativity bias and interpret 
customer product knowledge in a threatening sense, inducing them to overestimate CPI for 
knowledgeable customers. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H5:  The better the customer’s product knowledge, the higher the salesperson’s 
overestimation of CPI. 
Relationship length. There are plausible reasons for salespeople to assume that loyal 
customers whom they have known for many years attach less importance to price. The 
salesperson is more likely to attribute the customer’s loyalty to the good relationship than to 
economic motives, falling prey to self-serving interpretations (e.g., Campbell and Sedikides 
1999). In this case, the salesperson would expect the customer to be less focused on price 
because the customer would not want to harm the relationship by making high demands (Jap, 
Robertson, and Hamilton 2011). This view is promoted by practice literature (Nagle and 
Holden 1995), where loyal customers are often characterized as being more relationship-
oriented than price-oriented.  
Particularly when salespeople engage in heuristic rather than analytical processing 
(Chaiken and Trope 1999) they are likely to interpret customer loyalty in the way developed 
above, because this interpretation is self-serving (e.g., Campbell and Sedikides 1999). 
However, if they do so, they overlook the possibility that customers’ loyalty could lead to even 
higher CPI. A recent study by Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel (2014) supports this view. They 
demonstrate that even though loyal customers are less price-sensitive, they attach much more 
importance to price in discount negotiations than new customers. The rationale for these 
findings is that customers might become accustomed to receiving discounts. Additionally, with 
increasing relationship length customers may expect to be rewarded for their loyalty to the 
company in terms of greater discounts and may perceive a higher negotiation power (Wieseke, 
Alavi, and Habel 2014). 
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In conclusion, the self-serving interpretation of salespeople that loyal customers attach 
less importance to price should be misleading. Thus, if salespeople rely on this cue and infer 
that relationship length decreases CPI, they will systematically underestimate CPI. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H6:  The longer the relationship with the customer, the greater the salesperson’s 
underestimation of CPI. 
Method 
Below, we describe our data collection method and sample characteristics and then specify our 
measures and the analytical approach we used to analyze the data. 
Data Collection and Sample 
Data requirements. Particularly in negotiation research, investigators have raised concerns 
regarding the generalizability of results obtained in laboratory settings (Evans and Beltramini 
1987; Zetik and Stuhlmacher 2002). We therefore decided to conduct our study in the field. 
However, this approach required extensive effort from our research team. First, we had to find 
a context where prices are negotiated regularly. Second, to measure perceptual accuracy in 
social interactions, we needed at least two data sources—the target (customer) and the 
perceiver (salesperson)—making a dyadic approach necessary. Third, as customer perceptions 
may be biased in some cases, we employed observers to validate customers’ answers and also 
validated the discount measure by referring to objective company records. 
Sample description. To fulfill the requirements set out above, we collected dyadic data 
from salesperson–customer interactions in a B2C car retailing setting (28 different dealerships). 
We chose the context of the automobile retailing industry because discount negotiations 
regularly occur when customers purchase cars. To make our sample as balanced as possible, 
we cooperated with car dealership chains that were situated in 11 different cities and that 
offered new and used cars of 5 different brands. 
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 Each salesperson completed a questionnaire providing general perceptions and attitudes 
concerning his or her job. Additionally, we obtained data from salespeople and their customers 
after sales conversations with the help of questionnaires, which our research team personally 
administered to salespeople and customers to achieve the best possible response rates and to 
ensure accurate matching. The questionnaires referred to the one specific car which was the 
major subject of the sales interaction. Since customers entered the sales interactions with very 
clear preferences regarding the feature set of the car the subject of the interaction did not shift 
from one to another car. In the majority of interactions salesperson and customer initially 
specified the features of the car and then negotiated the price based on a fixed feature 
configuration with a fixed feature set.  
Customers and salespeople were matched by using code numbers. After about 30 weeks 
of data collection (we spent an average time of one week per dealership), we had obtained 537 
salesperson–customer interactions. In this process, 171 salespeople and 537 customers were 
surveyed, with a mean of 3.16 interactions recorded per salesperson, ranging between one and 
10 interactions. The response rate for salespeople was 100%, as participation was obligatory, 
and the response rate for customers was about 45%. The average age of salespeople was 37.68 
years with a median of 38 and a standard deviation of 10.69, and the average job experience 
was 12.87 years (SD = 9.79), ranging between 0 and 44 years. The customers had a mean age 
of 44.7 with a median of 44 (SD = 14.69). 
In order to avoid biasing the results by only observing successful sales interactions we 
collected data both on discount negotiations which were closed with a sale (45% of the 
interactions) and interactions where no agreement was reached (55% of the interactions). 
However, all interactions ended with a final sales price the salesperson offered to the customer. 
We asked the customer for his or her purchase intention (i.e., how likely a later purchase was) 
in order to reflect whether there was disagreement on the sales price or whether the purchase 
decision was only delayed. 
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Selection bias check. In our field study design, customers who participated in our study 
could have systematically varied from customers who declined to participate. Thus, to check 
whether such a selection bias might confound the results of the data analysis, we inspected 
whether responses from participants systematically differed from responses of non-participants. 
Using special incentives (free car wash vouchers) and a very short version of the questionnaire, 
we collected data from customers who originally did not intend to participate. We then 
compared responses from participants with responses from non-participants with regard to 
critical customer variables (CPI, negotiated discount, age, and relationship length) using a 
MANOVA approach. The results show that the groups do not differ systematically regarding 
these variables. Thus, a selection bias is unlikely to be an issue for the sample. 
Measures 
The Appendix provides a full list of items employed in this study, including the results of the 
confirmatory factor analysis. Below, we focus on discussing the measures of the core 
constructs. 
For the CPI sensing accuracy measure, we followed prior research on perceptual 
accuracy (Gill and Swann 2004) and employed a dual-perspective approach to measure the 
construct. The basic notion of our CPI sensing accuracy measurement is to compare the 
salesperson’s rating of CPI and the factual CPI indicated by the customer. If the salesperson’s 
rating of CPI closely matches the customer’s factual CPI, the salesperson’s CPI sensing 
accuracy is high. Conversely, if the salesperson’s rating of CPI strongly deviates from the 
customer’s factual CPI, the salesperson’s CPI sensing accuracy is low. Therefore, we 
calculated an absolute difference score of salesperson and customer CPI ratings to test our 
hypotheses relating to negotiation outcomes.  
To measure CPI, we used a ranking-based measurement approach. This measurement 
approach allowed us to consider that customers tend to evaluate the price of a product in 
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relation to its benefits or value (e.g. Hamilton and Srivastava 2008; Zeithaml 1984). By 
utilizing a ranking scale we could furthermore improve response validity and reduce the 
likelihood of demand effects by inducing customers to mentally trade-off alternatives (e.g. 
McCloy, Heggestad, and Reeve 2005). Both the salesperson and the customer completed a 
scale adapted from Homburg, Wieseke, and Bornemann (2009). Customers ranked price 
among five other shopping-related needs with regard to its importance for the buying decision. 
After each sales interaction, the salesperson was asked to indicate on the same scale the 
ranking of the respective customer’s shopping needs. To ensure that higher values reflect 
higher CPI, we reverse-coded the scale by subtracting the ratings from 7.  
Ranking measures are afflicted with the methodological problem that they are ordinal in 
nature and do not reflect weights of the ranking position. For instance, a customer might rank 
price second, but allocate a very low weight to it, as the first product attribute is by far the most 
important one. In this case there would be a long cognitive distance between the ranking 
positions 1 and 2 and a very small distance between the other ranks. If this was true in our data, 
the data pattern should reveal a non-linear relationship between CPI measured by a rating-scale 
and our ranking-based measure for customer price importance. However, results of a 
robustness-check show a linear relationship indicating that the distances between the ranking 
positions are very similar on average in our data. 
To measure negotiated discount, we asked customers to rate the received discount on 
the car’s sticker price in percent. Because objective data were not available for all interactions, 
the negotiated discount was quoted by the customer. This measure was validated with the help 
of a correlation analysis between customer quotes and company records (r = .712, n = 33, p < 
.01) and customer quotes and observer data (r = .802, n = 119, p < .01). 
Measurement reliability. With regard to reliability statistics, all values for Cronbach’s 
alpha, composite reliability (CR), and average variance extracted for all measurement scales 
meet or exceed recommended thresholds (Bagozzi and Yi 1988), indicating sufficient 
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reliability and convergent validity (the AVE for revenue goal importance is .48 and thereby 
slightly below the threshold of .5. As Cronbach’s Alpha and CR exceed the recommended 
values we refrained from excluding an item). We assessed discriminant validity using the 
criterion of Fornell and Larcker (1981). All constructs passed this test. 
Analytical Approach 
The data structure of the study comprises two levels—the interaction level of the sales 
encounter and the salesperson level. Therefore, we conducted our analysis using multi-level 
path analyses, which take into account that individuals within a particular group may be more 
similar to each other than to individuals in other groups (Hofmann 1997). We split our analysis 
into two parts. First, we examined the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiation outcomes 
(H1-3) and then we tested the effects of different heuristic cues on CPI sensing accuracy (H4-6). 
Analysis of CPI sensing accuracy consequences (H1-3). To examine the consequences of 
CPI sensing accuracy, we conducted a multilevel path analysis (Cohen et al. 2003). Since, H1 
suggests CPI sensing accuracy to decrease the negotiated discount regardless of whether the 
salesperson under- or overestimates CPI, we employed an absolute difference score measure of 
CPI sensing accuracy. For this purpose, we subtracted the customer’s rating from the 
salesperson’s rating and calculated the absolute value. 
Assessment of CPI Sensing Directionality. As methodological problems can arise with 
the use of an absolute difference score as independent variable in structural equation modeling, 
we conducted two additional analyses to check whether these problems might potentially bias 
our results. First, one of the most important problems pertains to the fact that absolute 
difference scores are “directionless measures of congruence, since they treat positive and 
negative scores the same” (Edwards 1994, p. 60). Even though we expect that the direction of 
CPI misperception should not matter in our context and analysis, we conducted a test 
recommended by prior research (Vosgerau, Anderson, and Ross 2008) in order to see whether 
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this assumption holds true. We included a variable into our model, which was -1 for an 
underestimation of CPI by the salesperson, 0 for an accurate assessment and 1 for an 
overestimation. Then, we included the interaction term of this direction variable and the 
absolute difference score measure of CPI sensing into the model to assess whether a significant 
impact on the negotiated discount emerged. Results showed that neither the direction variable 
itself (b = .30, SE = .52, n.s.) nor the interaction term with CPI sensing accuracy (b = .36, SE = 
.46) have a significant effect on negotiated discount, indicating that the direction of the 
misperception did not matter for our analysis.  
Second, we conducted a similar test to check whether the effect of CPI sensing 
accuracy differed between high and low CPI conditions, as this information is not considered 
when using an absolute difference score measure as independent variable (Edwards 1994). 
Therefore, we included an interaction term of CPI and the absolute CPI sensing accuracy 
measure into the model. However, the effect was nonsignificant indicating that the effect of 
CPI sensing on discount does not depend on the CPI level (b = -.27, SE = .28, n.s.). Thus, we 
conclude that our approach to utilize an absolute difference measure of CPI sensing accuracy is 
appropriate for our data. 
We conducted the analysis of hypotheses 1-3 in two steps. First, we estimated our 
model without interaction terms in order to test H1 and then in a second step we included the 
interaction terms of CPI and revenue goal importance and customer orientation in order to test 
H2 and H3. As H2 predicts a cross-level interaction between CPI sensing accuracy and revenue 
goal importance, following Hox (2010), we included a random slope into our model, which 
captured the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiated discount. 
Analysis of CPI sensing antecedents (H4-6). The goal of the second analysis was to 
identify cues salespeople take into account in assessing CPI and whether these cues lead to 
over- or underestimation of CPI. In order to answer this research question we followed a 
different approach than in our first analysis. We followed Edwards’ suggestion that 
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“conceptually distinct constructs [in our case, CPI and the salesperson’s assessment of CPI] 
should remain distinct in data analysis” (Edwards 1995, p. 310). Thus, we simultaneously 
tested the effects of all three independent variables on the salesperson’s and customer’s CPI 
rating which constitute the components of CPI sensing accuracy (Colbert et al. 2008).  This 
procedure had an important advantage regarding managerial implications of the study since we 
were able to test whether the respective CPI sensing cues lead to overestimation of CPI or to 
underestimation. Thus, an overestimation of CPI by the salesperson was indicated by a more 
positive effect of a specific cue on the salesperson’s rating compared to the customer’s rating. 
Conversely, an underestimation was indicated by a more negative effect of a specific cue on 
the salesperson’s rating compared to the customer’s rating. To test whether the over- or 
underestimation was significant, we conducted a further analysis with the raw difference score 
of CPI sensing accuracy (salesperson’s rating – customer’s rating) as dependent variable. A 
negative effect for a specific cue in this analysis indicates a significant underestimation, 
whereas a positive effect indicates a significant overestimation (Edwards 1995). 
Control variables. Beyond the hypothesized effects, we controlled for factors that were 
not included in the hypotheses. Since the negotiation outcomes may be influenced by 
interaction-specific constraints (Thompson 1990), we controlled for the encounter length and 
the product price level when testing H1-3. Furthermore, we controlled for the link between 
negotiated discount and purchase intention since the customer’s purchase intention may depend 
on the granted discount (Lax and Sebenius 1986). Thereby, we were able to test for a potential 
indirect effect of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase intention via negotiated discount. 
Eventually, we included an indicator for the direction of the salesperson’s misperception (over- 
or underestimation) into the model, to control for potential directionality effects. 
In addition to the hypothesized antecedents of CPI sensing (H4-6), we included 
encounter length and the salesperson’s job experience. Both variables may impact CPI sensing 
accuracy, since experienced salespeople may have better sensing skills (Szymanski 1988) and 
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the longer a sales interview takes, the more time has the salesperson to make an accurate 
assessment. Before we conducted the analyses all independent variables were standardized. 
Results 
Results for CPI Sensing Accuracy Outcomes 
All analyses were conducted using the statistical software MPlus 7.0 (Muthén and Muthén 
2012). Table 1 presents the correlations, means and standard deviations of the constructs. The 
results for the analysis of CPI sensing accuracy consequences (H1-3) appear in Table 2. Results 
provide support for H1, indicating that CPI sensing accuracy significantly reduces negotiated 
discount (b = -.96, SE = .48, p < .05). Moreover, the negative effect of CPI sensing accuracy on 
negotiated discount is enhanced by revenue goal importance (H2: b = -.73, SE = .41, p < .05), 
which corroborates H2. Figure 4 shows the interaction effect.  
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
---- Insert Figure 4 about here ---- 
We also find evidence that CPI sensing accuracy has no main effect on purchase 
intention (b = -.10, SE = .08, n.s.). Neither is there an indirect effect via negotiated discount, 
since the effect of negotiated discount on purchase intention is not significant (b = .00, SE = 
.02, n.s.). However, results reveal a significant interaction effect between salesperson’s 
customer orientation and CPI sensing accuracy (b = .11, SE = .04, p < .01), which supports H3. 
Figure 4 illustrates that CPI sensing accuracy only has detrimental effects on purchase 
intention for salespeople with low customer orientation (simple slope effect: b = -.24, SE = .10, 
p < .01). For highly customer-oriented salespeople, the effect has a positive sign, but is not 
significant (b = .02, SE = .08, n.s.). Additionally, we conducted a robustness check by testing 
the model without controls. All hypothesized effects remained significant and consistent. 
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Taken together, these results indicate that CPI sensing accuracy has the hypothesized effects on 
negotiation outcomes. 
Results for CPI Sensing Accuracy Antecedents  
Results for the analysis of CPI sensing accuracy antecedents (H4-6) are displayed in Table 3. 
Overall, our results provide support for the notion that salespeople make use of cognitive 
heuristics to form CPI perceptions and that relying on certain cues induces CPI misperceptions. 
In H4 we hypothesized that customer age induces salespeople to underestimate CPI. Our 
findings support this hypothesis since customer age has a significant negative effect on CPI 
sensing accuracy (H4: b = -.02, SE = .01, p < .01). The same holds true for H6 regarding 
relationship length (H6: b = -.06, SE = .03, p < .05). Both cues lead to significant 
underestimations of CPI. Furthermore, we find support for the effect of the customer’s product 
knowledge on CPI sensing accuracy (H5). Our findings indicate a significant overestimation of 
customer price importance by the salesperson with increasing product knowledge of the 
customer (H5: b = .11, SE = .06, p < .05). This overestimation occurs because salespeople do 
not seem to recognize that customers with higher product knowledge have lower CPI in fact. 
The controls have no significant effects on CPI sensing accuracy. 
---- Insert Table 3 about here ---- 
Discussion 
Although retailing literature stresses the importance of salespeople’s effectiveness (Haas and 
Kenning 2014) and emphasizes the relevance of interpersonal perceptions in salesperson-
customer interactions (Van Dolen et al. 2002), how salespeople form customer perceptions in 
retail price negotiations and to what effect remains unexplored. Therefore, CPI sensing—which 
we newly introduce and define as forming perceptions of the relevance a customer attaches to 
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price compared to other (benefit-related) product attributes —should be an essential 
precondition for a salesperson’s negotiation performance. 
The central goal of our study was to verify whether CPI sensing accuracy constitutes a 
success factor in retailing and to show that acquiring CPI information provides the salesperson 
with a veritable strategic advantage in price negotiations. Thereby, we address the omission in 
existing research regarding the process of gathering and using price-related information during 
sales interactions. We provide evidence that CPI sensing accuracy increases the salesperson’s 
negotiation performance, especially when the salesperson perceives high revenue goal 
importance. However, the salesperson needs at least a moderate degree of customer orientation 
to prevent detrimental effects of CPI sensing accuracy on the customer’s purchase intention. 
Regarding CPI sensing antecedents, we demonstrate that customer age and relationship length 
lead to an underestimation and customer product knowledge to an overestimation of CPI by the 
salesperson. 
Theoretical Implications 
Our research makes important contributions to retailing, sales and negotiation literature. 
Retailing researchers have spent considerable effort on examining methods to customize prices 
in order to increase profit margins (Grewal et al. 2011; Johnson, Tellis, and Ip 2013). By 
introducing CPI sensing in discount negotiations as an important tool to optimize discounts for 
individual customers, we shed light on an effective technique which has not received much 
attention in prior retailing literature. Thereby, we support and expand findings from prior 
retailing literature that salespeople who understand their customers well not only perform 
superiorly in terms of building customer relationships (Beatty et al. 1996; Reynolds and Beatty 
1999) but also immediately with respect to monetary outcomes. 
Moreover, our study contributes to the literature on the delegation of pricing authority 
to the sales force (Frenzen et al. 2010; Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979). This stream of 
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research has found contradictory results regarding the effectiveness of this decision to delegate 
(Homburg, Jensen, and Hahn 2012). From a theoretical perspective, the delegation of pricing 
authority to salespeople should lead to higher profits, because salespeople are closer to the 
market than their management and therefore should possess superior knowledge about their 
customers’ price-related needs (Frenzen et al. 2010). However, these theoretical predictions 
have not always been confirmed in practice (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979). We are able 
to show that the assumption that salespeople possess superior knowledge about their 
customers’ price importance may not always and automatically hold true.  
Instead, a reasonable assumption is that salespeople exhibit considerable heterogeneity 
regarding their customer-related price knowledge. Our findings indicate that cognitive biases 
may reduce the informational edge salespeople have compared to their management and lead to 
suboptimal salesperson behavior in negotiations. Consequently, we propose that the effect of 
delegating pricing authority to salespeople on achieved profit should be strongly affected by 
the CPI sensing proficiency of the salesforce. Thus, integrating CPI sensing accuracy into 
models that try to forecast the impact of pricing authority delegation on performance could 
enhance the models’ explanatory power. 
Related to this aspect, a promising avenue for future research should be to further 
investigate CPI sensing cues, like for example customer behavior. In our study, we identify 
three heuristic cues which distort salespeople’s perceptions of CPI. Thereby, our study focuses 
on heuristic processing of salespeople. However, a recent study by Hall, Ahearne, and Sujan 
(2015) demonstrates that salespeople use both intuitive and deliberate judgment processes. 
Thus, investigating the combination of heuristic and analytic processing may help to further 
elucidate the process of CPI sensing. 
Moreover, future research might engage in a deeper examination of differences between 
CPI sensing and sensing of other price-related constructs such as customers’ price sensitivity. 
The most important difference between CPI and price-sensitivity is the relative nature of CPI 
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(i.e., CPI sets the importance of price in relation to the importance of other product attributes). 
This difference is important for our conceptual model, since we suppose that “price sensitivity 
sensing” would not yield equal effects on retail performance. Only relying on price sensitivity 
to assess customers’ negotiation behavior might induce the salesperson to choose the wrong 
argumentation strategy. For instance, a customer may state to be very price-sensitive, but at the 
same time attach an even higher importance to other product attributes. In this case the 
salesperson would not focus on the benefits the customer values most. 
Even though we invested great effort into the development of a rigorous study there are 
limitations to our research design. Specifically, while we suggest heuristic cues to distort 
salespeople’s CPI sensing accuracy we do not measure all of these cues from salespeople’s 
viewpoint. Customer age and product knowledge are rated by the customer. Thus, their effects 
on CPI sensing accuracy might be even higher if salespeople’s perceptions were taken into 
account.  
Furthermore, we test the effect of CPI sensing accuracy on negotiated discount with 
help of an absolute difference measure. While an additional analysis provides empirical 
evidence that in our study the direction of misperception does not matter regarding negotiation 
outcomes, there may be contingencies which render the direction of the CPI misperception 
more important. For instance, in a business-to-business negotiation context owing to the 
enhanced negotiation experience of purchasing agents, underestimating CPI may entail more 
dire consequences for the salesperson’s price enforcement than overestimating the purchasing 
agent’s CPI which may entail a more cautious bargaining stance. 
Managerial Implications 
Our findings also have important, actionable implications for retailing practice. The study 
clearly shows that retail salespeople should engage in CPI sensing to increase negotiation 
success. By acquiring individual CPI information, salespeople obtain a strategic advantage in 
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discount negotiations because they are able to adjust their argumentation strategy to the 
individual customer. In our study, accurate CPI sensing helps salespeople to grant a discount 
that is on average 1.96% lesser (6.57% compared to 8.53%) while maintaining the customers’ 
purchase intention. This reduction saves the salesperson an average of $616 per car sold which 
is a significant increase of the retail margin. 
This positive impact on profit is even enhanced if the salesperson considers the revenue 
goal to be of high importance. Thus, retail managers should stress the importance of revenue 
goals and provide salespeople with incentives to attain them. Moreover, if salespeople engage 
in CPI sensing and combine it with a strong customer orientation, they are able to alleviate 
negative effects of CPI sensing accuracy on purchase intention. Thus, in line with prior 
literature retail managers should train their salespeople to be customer oriented and to adapt to 
individual customers. In this respect, our findings suggest that CPI sensing might also represent 
a valuable skill in retail interactions without discount negotiations. Salespeople who make 
accurate CPI assessments may be better able to address their customers’ needs, offer them 
products that correspond to their price importance, and thus, sell more and higher priced 
products.  
However, the sales force should be well trained in CPI sensing in order to avoid 
misclassifying customers. We provide starting points for such trainings by identifying cues that 
lead to misperceptions of CPI. By relying on customer age as CPI sensing cue salespeople 
underestimate CPI on average by 14%. The average underestimation when relying on 
customer-salesperson relationship length amounts to 1.2%, but increases dramatically for 
longer relationships (ten years relationship length would induce an underestimation of 9.3%). 
Furthermore, salespeople appear to neglect information on customer product knowledge for 
CPI sensing. This neglect leads salespeople to a CPI overestimation by 9.5% for customers 
with average product knowledge. Since our findings indicate that relying on heuristic cues 
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leads to significant misperceptions, salespeople should try to engage more in analytic 
processing in order to form more accurate CPI perceptions. 
In essence, we strongly encourage practitioners in the retail context to foster their sales 
force’s CPI sensing proficiency. If salespeople are able to improve their CPI sensing accuracy 
and adapt their negotiation strategy accordingly, they achieve higher levels of negotiation 
success without sacrificing customers’ purchase intention, fostering salespeople’s financial 
performance. 
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TABLE 1  
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CPI sensing variables                     
1. CPI1               
2. Salesperson's CPI perception .209**              
3. CPI sensing accuracy .401** .484**             
CPI sensing accuracy outcome               
4. Negotiated discount (in percent) -.100* -.112* -.203**            
5. Purchase intention -.103* -.136** -.115* .179**           
Moderators               
6. Revenue goal importance -.048 -.012 .064 -.010 .002          
7. Salesperson's customer orientation -.066 -.105* -.073 .168** .219** .105*         
CPI sensing cues               
8. Customer age -.109* -.204** -.176** .194** .146** .110* .138**        
9. Customer product knowledge -.094 -.004 -.079 .142* .081 -.010 -.004        
10. Relationship length (in years) -.116* -.165** -.108* .172** .240** .065 .174** .188**       
Controls               
11. Encounter Length -.051 -.128** -.074 .202** .268** .047 .154** .079 .089 .166**     
12. Product Price Level (in €) -.243** -.247** -.171** .155** .025 .033 .132** .222** .292** .148** .070    
13. Salesperson’s Experience (in years) -.106* -.179** -.088 .238** .051 .022 .009 .102* .105* .193** .079 .134**   
14. Direction of Misperception -.490** .766** .158** .023 .017 -.024 .057 .107 -.080 .029 .096 .064 .096  
  Mean 4.86 4.81 1.25 7.49 5.66 4.15 4.92 44.75 4.15 1.31 42.54 29416 12.89 -2 
  Standard deviation 1.21 1.52 1.20 6.47 1.59 1.26 1.59 14.68 1.59 3.73 33.37 17423 9.81 -2 
1CPI = Customer price importance 2Categorial variable 
*p < .05 ; **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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TABLE 2 
Results for CPI Sensing Accuracy Consequences 
    Model 1 (without interactions) Model 2 (with interactions) 
Independent variable Hypothesis 
Effect on 
negotiated 
discount 
SE 
Effect on 
purchase 
intention 
SE 
Effect on 
negotiated 
discount 
SE 
Effect on 
purchase 
intention 
SE 
Main effects 
    
  
    CPI sensing accuracy H1 (-) -.96* .48 -.10 .08 -1.02* .47 -.11 .08 
Customer orientation 
 
.60 .57 .32** .10 .59 .53 .31** .09 
Revenue goal importance 
 
-.47 .49 .01 .09 -.40 .48 .04 .09 
Interaction effects 
 
        
CPI sensing X Revenue goal importance H2 (-) - - - - -.73* .41 -.11 .07 
CPI sensing X Customer orientation H3 (+) - - - - -.14 .26 .11** .04 
Controls 
 
        
Encounter Length 
 
1.32** .40 .37** .08 1.34** .40 .34** .08 
Product Price Level 
 
.57 .46 .02 .08 .50 .49 .02 .08 
Direction of Misperception1  .51 .42 .06 .08 .56 .42 .04 .08 
Negotiated discount 
 
- - .00 .02 - - .01 .03 
*p < .05; **p < .01 (one-tailed); SE = Standard Error; 1 Direction of Misperception: 1 = Overestimation, -1 = Underestimation 
As we conducted a multi-level path analysis unstandardized path coefficients are reported. 
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TABLE 3 
Results for CPI Sensing Accuracy Antecedents  
Hypothesis Independent variable 
Effect on CPI 
sensing accuracy 
(raw difference) 
 
SE Over- or underestimation Hypothesis confirmed? 
H4 Customer age -.019** .008 Underestimation1  
H5 
Customer product 
knowledge .109* .064 Overestimation  
H6 
Customer-SP relationship 
length -.058* .031 Underestimation  
*p < .05; **p < .01 (one-tailed); SE = Standard Error; 1To read: salesperson underestimates CPI with increasing customer age. 
All effects were estimated in one model. As we conducted a multi-level path analysis unstandardized path coefficients are reported. 
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FIGURE 1 
The Role of CPI Sensing in Retail Price Negotiations - Illustration of the Research Void
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FIGURE 2 
Conceptual Framework: A Comprehensive Account of CPI Sensing in Retail Price Negotiations
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FIGURE 3 
How Does CPI Sensing Accuracy Influence the Negotiated Discount? An Illustration of 
CPI Sensing Accuracy Consequences 
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FIGURE 4  
The Moderating Role of Revenue Goal Importance on the Link between  
CPI Sensing Accuracy and Negotiated Discount 
 
The Moderating Role of Customer Orientation on the Link between  
CPI Sensing Accuracy and Purchase Intention 
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APPENDIX 
Constructs and Items CR AVE α 
CPI Sensing (Homburg, Wieseke & Bornemann 2009)1,2 
. . . 
We are interested in how important price is for you compared to other factors with respect to 
buying a car. Please consider the following factors and rate what ranking position price has 
for you among those with respect to the importance for your purchase decision. Thus, if price 
is the most important factor, rate "1", if it is the second most important "2" and so forth. 
Please rank the relative importance of price compared to... 
…convenience; service; security; shopping enjoyment; additional features 
Please note that we recoded the scale by subtracting the price ranking rated by salesperson 
and customer from 7 to ensure that higher values reflected higher CPI 
Negotiation Outcomes    
Negotiated Discount1,3,4 
. . . 
I received _________% discount. (validated with company and observer data) 
Purchase Intention1 
. . . 
It is very likely that I buy this car in this dealership. (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
Moderators of Effects on Negotiation Outcomes    
Revenue Goal Importance (Jaworski & MacInnis 1989)2 (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
.79 .48 .78 
If I do not meet my monthly revenue goals that is very bad for me. 
If I do not meet my monthly revenue goals that is very bad for my financial situation. 
If I do not meet my monthly revenue goals that is very bad for my job. 
If I do not meet my monthly revenue goals that is very bad for my reputation among my 
colleagues. 
Customer Orientation (Thomas, Soutar & Ryan 2001)1 (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
.86 .67 .84 
The salesperson has taken a problem solving approach in selling products or services to me. 
The salesperson had my best interests in mind. 
The salesperson has recommended products or services to me that are best suited to solve my 
problems. 
CPI Sensing Cues    Customer Age1 
. . . Your age: ________ 
Customer Product Knowledge (Wagner, Klein & Keith 2001)1 
.89 .72 .89 
I understand the features of cars enough to be considered an expert when evaluating different 
brands. 
I know exactly what product characteristics are needed when buying a car. 
If a friend of mine were buying a car, I would be an excellent source of information. 
Relationship length (Bell, Auh & Smalley 2005)1,2 
. . . 
For how long do you know the salesperson (customer)?            ________ years 
Controls    
Encounter Length1 
. . . 
How long did the encounter last? _________ minutes 
Salesperson's Experience (Levy & Sharma 1994)2 
. . . 
For how many years have you been working as a salesperson? ________________ years 
Product Price Level1 
. . . 
What do you think is the average price one has to pay for this car? _________  € 
1Customer Data; 2Salesperson Data; 3Observer Data; 4Company Data    
CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted    
 
